This article identifies two countervailing sets of norms -one promoting humanitarian engagement with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in armed conflict in order to protect populations in need, and the other prohibiting such engagement with listed 'terrorist' groups in order to protect security -and discusses how this conflict of norms might affect the capacity of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving assistance in areas under the control of one of these groups. Rooted in international humanitarian law (IHL), the first set of norms provides a basis for humanitarian
engagement with NSAGs in non-international armed conflict for the purpose of assisting populations under their control and promoting compliance with the rules of IHL. The second set of rules attempts to curtail financial and other forms of material support, including technical training and co-ordination, to listed 'terrorist' organizations, some of which may qualify as NSAGs under IHL. The article highlights counter-terrorism regulations developed by the United States and the United Nations Security Council, though other states and multilateral bodies have similar regulations. The article concludes by sketching ways in which humanitarian organizations might respond to the identified tensions.
'Material support' is a valuable resource by definition. Such support frees up other resources within the [terrorist] organization that may be put to violent ends. It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups -legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds -all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks. 1 (Chief Justice Roberts)
In recent months, many working in the humanitarian profession have contemplated the image of an aid worker standing before a criminal court, accused of providing support for terrorism while conducting legitimate humanitarian activities. This article explores how that image came about, and how life-saving and impartial humanitarian assistance may be legally construed as providing unlawful benefits to non-state armed groups (NSAGs) 2 listed as 'terrorist' organizations. Humanitarian assistance delivered in times of armed conflict and its corollary -the autonomous negotiation between independent humanitarian organizations and all parties to conflict -have often come under pressure from security and political demands. International humanitarian law (IHL) has sought to balance the security interests of the parties to an armed conflict with the humanitarian interest of ensuring that life-saving goods and services reach civilians and others hors de combat even in the midst of fighting. 3 For the past decade, a quiet development has altered this balance. The promulgation by states of domestic criminal laws prohibiting material support to listed terrorist entities, and multilateral laws and policies creating a corresponding global counter-terrorism regime, present serious but little-discussed concerns for those engaged in the provision of life-saving humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts involving certain NSAGs. The interaction between long-standing norms of IHL providing modest but clear protection for the work of impartial, independent humanitarian organizations and these domestic laws, donor policies, and multilateral norms is yet to be fully understood. This article seeks to explore contradictions between various state commitments, and to reflect briefly on the potential responses of the humanitarian community to the dilemmas posed by the counter-terrorism framework.
This article proceeds in three sections. The first section provides an overview of IHL provisions pertaining to humanitarian engagement in situations of non-international armed conflict (NIAC). In addition to laying out the IHL terrain regulating humanitarian engagement with NSAGs, this section outlines relevant developments in international law and multilateral policy building upon IHL and strengthening humanitarian claims for access and autonomous negotiation with NSAGs for the purpose of assisting and protecting vulnerable populations. The second section discusses recent developments concerning material-support-of-terrorism laws in the United States, particularly the recent case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (Holder v. HLP). 4 In addition, this section explores US administrative laws and donor policies imposing counterterrorism-based restrictions on various forms of support to listed terrorist groups or individuals. It draws connections between US material-support laws and several key UN Security Council resolutions on global counter-terrorism. The final main section provides an explanatory framework for understanding what might motivate governments to take contradictory approaches to humanitarian engagement with NSAGs, and then sketches a number of possible ways in which the humanitarian community might respond to the legal and policy tensions discussed in the article. The conclusion highlights the fact that, despite this tension, neither the humanitarian imperative of assisting populations in need of life-saving relief nor the security imperative of preventing resources to be unduly transferred to listed 'terrorist' organizations will be going away any time soon. Beyond the conceptual nature of this tension, states in a dialogue with humanitarian organizations might attempt to establish procedures, principles, and practices that would facilitate co-ordinated planning and execution of humanitarian operations in these situations.
International humanitarian law bases for humanitarian engagement with non-state armed groups
This section sketches the mission of humanitarian organizations and how IHL provides clear, although limited, bases for such organizations to engage with NSAGs in NIAC. It aims to outline the set of norms underlying humanitarian engagement with NSAGs so that those norms may be juxtaposed with the counter-terrorism-based laws and policies explored in detail in the second section. In outlining the bases for humanitarian engagement with NSAGs under broadly accepted interpretations of IHL, this section does not enter into the discussion on the status and content of a 'right' (if any) to provide or receive humanitarian assistance in armed conflict. 5 The mission of humanitarian organizations
The core and distinctive mission of humanitarian organizations is to provide lifesaving assistance to populations in need in times of armed conflict. To deliver this assistance, humanitarian organizations must, operationally and under law, seek the consent of the relevant party or parties. 6 Practically speaking, in a NIAC where a population is under the control of an NSAG, humanitarian organizations must negotiate their access with the NSAG and, in most cases, seek the NSAG's cooperation in order to ensure the safety and integrity of an organization's operations. While by definition the purpose of humanitarian assistance is limited to provide life-saving relief for the population, NSAGs may derive direct or indirect benefits from this interaction. . US federal law also prohibits providing material support or resources to 'terrorists': 18 U.S.C. para. 2339A. 15 18 U.S.C. para. 2339A(b)(2), defined as 'instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge'. 16 18 U.S.C. para. 2339A(b)(3), defined as 'advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge'. 17 According to the statute, 'No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term "personnel" unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with one or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization's direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization's direction and control.' 18 U.S.C. para. 2339B(h).
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violations'. 18 The currently applicable exemption for 'medicine' does not appear to encompass anything other than medicine itself and therefore seems to exclude all other activities (such as medical treatment or technical training) and resources (such as medical supplies or equipment) associated with the provision of medical assistance. 19 While the statute provides a limited basis on which humanitarian organizations may apply to the government to be exempted from prosecution, the grounds for granting such an exemption are narrow. 20 Criminal liability arises from both the objective element of the crime (the so-called actus reus -that is, committing a prohibited, or omitting a required, act) and the subjective element (the so-called mens rea -having a specified level of knowledge or intent, or both, concerning the act). In terms of material support, the offender need not have intended to further the terrorist aims of the group to violate the statute. Rather, it is sufficient under the statute that the person providing material support has knowledge either that the organization is an FTO (that is, the organization is designated as such by the Secretary of State in accordance with US law) or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism or terrorist activity. 21 The statute prohibits providing, attempting to provide, or conspiring to provide material support or resources to such organizations. A violation of the statute may entail a fine or imprisonment of up to fifteen years, or both. If the death of any person results, the violator 'may be imprisoned for any term of years or for life'. 22 The US may exercise jurisdiction over an individual, even if he or she is not a US national, who violates (or aids, abets, or conspires with an individual who violates) the statute and who is later 'brought into or found in the [US], even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside [the US]'. 23 In effect, this provision means that the personnel of an organization headquartered outside the US and made up entirely of non-US staff, with operations completely outside the US, could be subject to US criminal jurisdiction if they find themselves in the US. In June 2010, in Holder v. HLP, the US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute that prohibits knowingly providing 'material support or resources' to designated FTOs. The case arose as a pre-enforcement challenge brought by two organizations and six individuals seeking a ruling as to whether the three activities that the plaintiffs wanted to engage in would violate the statute, and, if so, whether the statute as applied to those proposed activities would contravene the US Constitution. In short, the Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) and others wanted to engage in three proposed activities, but could not for fear of prosecution under the statute. Those three activities were: training members of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) to use international law to resolve disputes; teaching PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief; and engaging in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds living in Turkey or Tamils living in Sri Lanka. The HLP argued that certain constitutional protectionsincluding freedom of speech and association, and due process of law (which prohibits overly vague criminal laws) -precluded the government from enforcing the statute against the HLP's proposed activities. 24 The litigation leading to the Supreme Court's judgment in Holder v. HLP spent many years making its way through US courts. 25 In 1994, Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, a section of which defines the crime of providing material support or resources to terrorists. 26 In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which amended the section prohibiting material support to terrorists and added a section prohibiting the provision of material support or resources to FTOs. 27 Combined, these federal criminal statutes set out the crimes of providing 'material support or resources' to terrorists and foreign terrorist groups, and enumerate the broad set of activities seen as providing benefit to these groups. Both sections were amended by the post-9/11 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (which increased the penalties for committing 'material support' crimes and added 'expert advice or assistance' to the list of prohibited forms of support), and by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, which amended and clarified definitions within the two sections. 28 After a lower-court decision voided language in the statute for vagueness, the government appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court accepted the case. In short, the Court was asked to consider the claim that the statute was unconstitutional because it was either too vague or too broad in relation to the HLP's proposed activities.
In its opening brief to the Supreme Court, the HLP argued that the First Amendment to the US Constitution (which states that 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech') protected their intended activities, which they characterized as pure political speech; that the material-support statute was unfairly vague; that portions of the statute impermissibly criminalized pure speech and discriminated on the basis of content; and that the statutory provisions at stake violated the constitutionally enshrined freedom to associate. 29 The HLP asserted that the Court could avoid addressing constitutional questions by interpreting the statute to require proof of intent to further an FTO's unlawful ends. 30 The government's arguments relied largely on the specificity included in the IRTPA, which amended the existing statute in regard to the terms 'knowingly', 'service', 'training', 'expert advice or assistance', and 'personnel'. The government argued that the statute is not void for vagueness just because the application of the terms 'training', 'expert advice or assistance', 'personnel', or 'service' may be difficult to define in some circumstances. Rather, the government stated, '[v]agueness lies not in occasional uncertainty about whether an incriminating fact has been proved, but in fundamental indeterminacy about what that fact is'. 31 The government highlighted the difference between membership in a designated terrorist group or independent promotion of the political goals of the group -which were not prohibited by the statute -and the act of 'giving material support to facilitate terrorism', for which there was no constitutionally protected right. 32 The government stated that the petitioners 'may join the PKK and LTTE, gather with those groups' members, and discuss subjects of mutual interest'. 33 According to the government's viewpoint, the material-support statute regulated activity when the petitioner wanted to 'do more than engage in discussion with terrorist groups'. 34 Multiple organizations submitted amicus curiae ('friend of the court') briefs to the Supreme Court. One amicus brief brought by a collection of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) mentioned that the statute could deleteriously affect the delivery of humanitarian aid. Foregrounding the discussion by declaring that the '[p]rovision of humanitarian aid often requires working with and providing expert advice and technical assistance to local actors', the organizations stressed that, when providing such aid, they 'adhere strictly to certain universal principles of humanitarian assistance. These principles require all providers of aid to draw sharp lines between humanitarian activities, which they support, and military activities, which they do not'. 35 Nonetheless, the organizations noted, 'in the context of war zones, particularly in geographic areas controlled or dominated by designated groups, some form of engagement with these groups, their members, or their supporters is sometimes inevitable'. 36 The organizations argued that, when providing instructions or guidance to local groups to further humanitarian aid operations, they were engaging in First Amendment-protected activity. At the same time, the organizations observed that the material-support statute does 'not clearly delineate the space available for amici to conduct on-the-ground humanitarian aid activities', and gave examples pertaining to Sri Lanka. 37 The US's obligations under international law were not raised or addressed by the plaintiffs, the government, or the Court. 38 Potentially to the surprise of individuals trained in legal systems in which international law is automatically incorporated into domestic law or in which international law provides a stand-alone basis for individuals to bring legal challenges against domestic laws, in the US litigators rarely rely solely on international law to challenge federal statutes. Rather, US lawyers frame their legal challenges in terms of constitutional rights. 39 Partly as a result, the Supreme Court does not assess the US's compliance with its international legal obligations with the frequency with which some other countries' highest courts assess their respective governments' compliance with international law. In a 6-3 ruling, the majority of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court used a broad conception of fungibility rooted in congressional findings -namely that, while some FTOs engage in political and humanitarian activities, such organizations 'are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct'. 41 The Court noted that 'Congress has avoided any restriction on independent advocacy', which would have been prohibited, 'or indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups'. 42 Three justices dissented, stating that at a minimum the government should have to show that the 'defendants provided support that they knew was significantly likely to help the organization pursue its unlawful terrorist aims'. 43 Executive 44 The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers the Order, which allows government authorities to designate and block (that is, freeze) the assets of individuals and entities that, among other things, 'assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for . . . or other services to or in support of' certain acts of terrorism or designated terrorists or terrorist groups, or that are 'otherwise associated with' designated terrorists or terrorist groups. 45 OFAC places the designated person or entity on its list of 'Specially Designated Nationals' (SDNs) and identifies them as 'Specially Designated Global Terrorists' (SDGT). With limited exceptions, all property and interests in property of designated parties in the US are frozen, as are transactions by US persons or within the US in such property or interests in property, including making a contribution of services for the benefit of designated parties. EO 13224 prohibits donations by US persons to designated parties of articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, and medicine. 46 OFAC may grant general or specific licenses to organizations to engage in certain forms of activity otherwise prohibited under EO 13224, yet it is difficult to discern from publicly available information the extent to which humanitarian organizations have successfully obtained such licenses.
Through an amendment in the USA PATRIOT Act, the government may impose all the blocking effects of a designation -including freezing the party's assets and criminalizing its transactions -without actually designating the party as an SDGT. 47 To impose all the freezing effects, the government needs only to assert that it has opened an investigation into designating the entity.
OFAC has listed several thousand organizations and numerous individuals, most of whom are non-US parties, under EO 13224. 48 US organizations subject to EO 13224, which have a stronger constitutional basis to challenge the Order, have brought legal actions against the imposition of sanctions without a warrant based on probable cause and fair notice of the charges, 49 as well as against the timing and process of a designation. 50 These challenges have not, thus far, made reference to the provisions of IHL discussed in the previous section.
Immigration and removal provisions
In addition to being subject to criminal and civil proceedings, non-US individuals who provide material support to certain NSAGs may be denied admission to, or deported from, the US. In this way, counter-terrorism laws, in conjunction with immigration and removal provisions, may affect humanitarian relief personnel attempting to visit, reside in, or immigrate to the US. 51 For example, an alien may be denied admission to, or deported from, the US for, Given the lack of publicly available records of most immigration proceedings, as well as the possibility that the threat of this provision could be utilized to dissuade individuals from pursuing immigration or asylum claims, the extent or degree to 47 Section 106 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended the IEEPA by adding the phrase 'block during the pendency of an investigation' after the word 'investigate' in 50 U.S.C. para. 1702 (a)(1)(B which this provision has been utilized in the immigration context is unknown. In any event, aside from the impact on humanitarian engagement highlighted elsewhere in this article, those working on refugee, asylum, and resettlement issues must also be increasingly aware of the relationship between the counter-terrorism framework and the international and domestic norms protecting asylum seekers and refugees. 53 
Administrative regulations
In order to ensure that funds are not diverted to proscribed terrorist organizations, '[a]ll NGOs applying for grants from USAID [United States Agency for International Development] are required to certify, before award of the grant will be made, that they do not provide material support to terrorists'. 54 Such certifications require the recipients of USAID funding to attest they have not provided (within ten years) and will not provide material support or resources to FTOs, to SDNs or SDGTs, or to individuals or entities designated by the UN Security Council's sanctions committee established under Security Council Resolution 1267. 55 In addition to reviewing those lists, USAID recipients must certify that they will take into account public information that is 'either reasonably available to the applicant . . . or that, from the totality of the facts and circumstances . . . the applicant should be aware of an individual or entity's terrorist ties'. 56 More detailed vetting procedures are reportedly required for NGOs applying for USAID grants to areas such as the West Bank, Gaza, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Yemen. 57 These USAID certifications expressly do not extend to furnishing USAID funds or USAID-financed commodities to the ultimate beneficiaries of USAID assistance . . . unless the Recipient has reason to believe that one or more of the beneficiaries commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates, or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts. 58 As with the material-support statute and EO 13224, relatively little is currently known about the ultimate depth of these certifications in terms of their impact on end-user beneficiaries of humanitarian goods. Acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council has created two counter-terrorism regimes with the capacity to affect humanitarian engagement with NSAGs, one of which is focused on the Taliban and Al Qaeda, while the other is not specific to a particular group. It is hard to overstate the normative power of resolutions decided under the Council's Chapter VII authority. UN member states are obliged to accept them and carry them out, including, where necessary, by enacting domestic laws. 59 Extensive bureaucracies have been built to enforce both regimes. While neither counter-terrorism regime instituted by the Security Council under review here may yet function to regulate humanitarian action in all UN member states in the same manner and with the same clarity as the US material-support law, the language of both resolutions -and especially Resolution 1373 -can clearly be utilized by states, particularly host states, wishing to restrict humanitarian organizations' access to and engagement with NSAGs.
Multilateral counter-terrorism regimes
Resolutions 1267 (1999) et seq. require all UN member states to freeze the funds and other financial assets of individuals and entities designated by a sanctions committee, as well as to prevent the entry or transit through their territories of designated individuals. 60 As of March 2011, the Consolidated List included 395 individuals and 92 entities and other groups associated with the Taliban or Al Qaeda. 61 Resolutions 1373 (2001) et seq. require all UN member states to '[r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts', as well as to prohibit their nationals and individuals in their territories from making economic or financial resources or services, among other things, available for the benefit of individuals or entities involved in certain terrorist acts. 62 Resolution 1373 further obliges all UN member states to '[c] riminalize the willful provision . . . , by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts', and to '[e]nsure that any person who participates . . . in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice'. 63 Domestic and international legal challenges to the implementation of the 1267 and 1373 regimes have been brought in courts in the European Community, the US, the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland, Pakistan, Turkey, and Canada, as well as in the Human Rights Committee. 64 Thus far, these challenges have focused on the due process concerns pertaining to the mechanisms for listing and de-listing, not on humanitarian engagement concerns as such.
Understanding government approaches, discerning the impact on humanitarian organizations, and exploring possible humanitarian responses The two normative trajectories described above -one rooted in IHL recognizing the importance of humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in NIACs, and the other aiming to prohibit the provision of material support to 'terrorist' groups -seem to evince a clear contradiction. For many, this raises questions: what are the ultimate goals of governments promulgating such opposing normative frameworks? How can humanitarian organizations better understand the approaches taken by governments, particularly those deeply involved in the global humanitarian project as donors and policy innovators? This section briefly explores potential explanations that might assist in interpreting states' behaviours regarding these countervailing norms. The section then discusses what impacts these differing norms might have on humanitarian organizations, and how humanitarian organizations might respond to them.
Understanding government approaches
This subsection briefly identifies four potential explanations of states' behaviours that, on the one hand, recognize the importance of humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in NIAC, and, on the other hand, curtail such engagement through counterterrorism laws and policies. 
Total prohibition
The first possible explanation sees the ultimate goal of the state in this regard as total prohibition of any benefit to, assistance for, or co-ordination with listed NSAGs, even if that prohibition risks the loss of humanitarian services to civilian populations or the disbanding of major humanitarian operations in territories controlled by listed NSAGs. This explanation is reflected, for example, in a broad 2001 call by the then US Secretary of Defense to end all 'support' benefitting 'terrorists'. 65 The 'total prohibition' understanding sees the state as coherent and strategic in its thinking. The state is making a clear choice to favour security interests over humanitarian principles or humanitarian rationales for engagement with NSAGs. In this mode, states may even see humanitarian organizations as naïve 'soft spots' in counter-terrorism efforts, unthinkingly and unknowingly providing succour and political legitimacy to dangerous militant groups.
Mitigation
The second possible explanation for these countervailing regulatory trajectories is that states seek mitigation of benefits to NSAGs. Under this model, states wish to utilize domestic laws and international and donor policies to rein in humanitarian actors' interactions with NSAGs because they wish to limit the threats that this interaction presents to security by making humanitarian organizations more accountable. This explanation holds that, rather than being contradictory, the two trajectories are meant to signal that humanitarian organizations will be held responsible, if they do not take certain prescribed steps, for their engagement with listed NSAGs. The 'mitigation' explanation is reflected, for example, in the monitoring-and-reporting requirements imposed by the UN Security Council in the limited humanitarian-assistance carve-out for Somalia in Resolution 1916. 66 A policy of 'mitigation' may be rational for individual states, and may indeed serve as part of a coherent approach to making humanitarian organizations more accountable. Yet it may be impossible for any global humanitarian actor to satisfy all of the mitigation and accountability standards of various individual donors, states, and multilateral agencies.
Fragmentation
A third explanation suggests a lack of integration of internal policies, with some state organs supporting counter-terrorism measures as a priority and others promoting humanitarian action. In some ways the opposite of prohibition of engagement with NSAGs, 'fragmentation' holds that the seemingly incoherent and confusing nature of these trajectories is just that: incoherent and confusing. The 'fragmentation' model proposes that states lack internal consistency, with counterterrorism and humanitarianism competing for normative supremacy. The uncertainty resulting from fragmentation may be intentional or unintentional, but this model holds that there is no overarching state policy to be identified. As an example, when certain data regarding the tremendous scope of US funding for humanitarian assistance 67 are read next to the material-support statute, 68 it would appear that the various branches (and sub-branches) of the US government are not necessarily acting in concert.
Under the 'fragmentation' theory, states would be seen as internally divided and lacking in proper channels of communication within their own government agencies. In this understanding, it may be that the state, writ large, is not fully aware of the functional impact of its counter-terrorism laws and policies on international aid and assistance. Indeed, the state may lack a grand strategy of how the two trajectories should be harmonized. Of course, it may be that counter-terrorism laws and policies reflect states' desire to keep multiple political and security objectives in play, and that this approach to foreign policy may allow states to keep humanitarian actors in a defensive posture.
Co-optation
The final explanation for the behaviour of states is co-optation. Rather than seeking to engage in a 'course correction' by making humanitarian organizations more accountable, or rather than wishing to limit what they see as the excesses of humanitarian willingness to bend to the wishes of armed actors, states instead see the two countervailing trajectories as a basis for 'co-optation' of humanitarianism into the security and political objectives of the state. This perspective sees humanitarian organizations as providing key intelligence to security actors, as well as direct military relief efforts. In a 'co-optation' approach, governments may be seen as responding to the diversion of humanitarian assistance and the potential legitimization of terrorist groups, not by engaging in regulation to mitigate this harmful effect but rather by structuring regulation so that humanitarian organizations are increasingly incorporated into the aid, reconstruction, and national security agenda of the state. This approach sees humanitarianism and the access of the humanitarian community to the 'hearts and minds' of the civilian population as central to contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts.
Potential impacts for humanitarian organizations and possible responses
This subsection explores the question of how the complex web of laws and policies discussed above might affect humanitarian organizations and their work in situations of NIAC, and then identifies a few potential ways in which humanitarian organizations might respond to these impacts.
It is, of course, impossible to determine with certainty the likelihood of actual prosecutions against humanitarian organizations or their staff. Combined, the counter-terrorism laws discussed here and the interpretations of these laws by the relevant government body (whether it be the US Supreme Court, the Department of Justice, OFAC, or USAID) create a threat to a large array of activities that are, nonetheless, often sanctioned, encouraged, planned, and funded by the same government. Donor governments may maintain this posture -as informal, tenuous, and implicit as it may be -so long as they do not perceive the concerned FTOs as presenting insuperable threats to the state's security or its political interests. States might (retroactively) invoke their criminal laws or other sanctions against humanitarian organizations, however, if this balance tips in favour of perceived security.
Even assuming the continued trend of non-prosecution of international humanitarian organizations continues, what are the other potential impacts of these laws and policies beyond criminal liability? Despite the absence of sufficient empirical or case-based studies on the effect of these criminal and regulatory laws on the humanitarian field, a number of possible impacts bear consideration by the humanitarian profession as a whole.
First, it may be that the presence and indeed expansion of laws criminalizing material support (including training and expert assistance) to listed entities will begin to affect governments' funding choices. That is, where governments become aware that their humanitarian aid funding will be used in a state whose territory is partially or totally controlled by a listed group, those governments may determine that there is no way to continue this funding without risking the support ultimately falling into the terrorists' hands. There is some indication that this has already occurred, for example in the case of Somalia, where a designated group (namely al-Shabaab, which is listed at both the US and international levels) controls much of the territory. 70 Second, one of the most vexing and complex impacts of the laws and policies discussed here may be virtually impossible to measure and weigh against the benefits of such legislation for counter-terror purposes: the chilling effect. This occurs when organizations, faced with the risk of criminal sanction or intimidated by increasingly strict administrative procedures required for projects carried out in areas where listed groups are active, 71 may simply decide to cut back on or halt their projects before any action is taken against them. Anecdotally, there is some evidence of organizations ceasing training activities, diminishing the scope of their proposals for government funding in emergency contexts, or reconsidering priorities where they sense a high risk of liability. 72 Because of the confusing and contradictory nature of these laws and policies, a significant risk of the chilling effect is that humanitarian organizations will limit themselves far beyond the actual limits of the law. The organizations may choose to take a conservative approach, which is thus less beneficial to civilian populations in need, in order to salvage their most critical programmes. Given the current general sense that staff from certain countries or certain faith groups are at higher risk of scrutiny or criminal liability, organizations may selectively limit their partner organizations, their staff, or their co-operation, in order to limit their exposure.
Possible humanitarian responses
In reviewing the provisions of IHL relevant to the work of independent, impartial humanitarian organizations in situations of NIAC, it is clear that the space for credible organizations to engage with all parties to the conflict, and especially those that control access to vulnerable populations, is central to the notion of neutral humanitarianism. Indeed, in an armed conflict setting, where humanitarian assistance may be the only reliable source of life-saving food, clean water, medical care, shelter, and clothing for civilians behind enemy lines, the capacity of humanitarian organizations to negotiate directly with parties to the conflict (without the suspicion that they represent the foreign policy goals of other parties to the conflict) 73 is one of the most crucial tools for these organizations to maintain their neutral posture and to serve those in need. This space for engagement and protected autonomy to deal with even the most unsavoury leaders in order to offer basic services to the civilian population is at the crux of IHL's modest recognition of the role and responsibility of humanitarian organizations in alleviating suffering. Scholars have noted that IHL does not create a 'right of humanitarian access' or an unlimited mandate for humanitarian organizations to carry out any activities they wish at any time and in any manner they choose. 74 Yet, at the very least, IHL applicable in NIACs recognizes that impartial humanitarian organizations may of their own volition offer their services to the parties to the conflict. 75 Indeed, with the adoption of Common Article 3 more than sixty years ago, parties to NIACs 'can no longer look upon it [such an offer of humanitarian services] as an unfriendly act, nor resent the fact that the organization making the offer has tried to come to the aid of the victims of the conflict'. 76 It is this assumption that the counter-terrorism model turns on its head.
If the types of impact identified above are seen as largely affecting projects and programmes, humanitarian organizations may develop a range of strategic and tactical responses, ranging from conceding (partial) incorporation into security and political approaches to (selectively) ending relationships with certain donors to (temporarily) ceasing activities in certain NIACs such as those in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 77 However, in reacting to the more existential threat cutting to the core of humanitarianism -that is, the autonomy to engage directly with all parties to an armed conflict and offer services for the benefit of the civilian populationhumanitarian organizations may develop responses at the underlying normative level, as discussed below.
Developing new norms to regulate humanitarian engagement with NSAGs
If the tensions between humanitarian law and policy, on the one hand, and counterterrorism law and policy, on the other, are as fundamental as highlighted here, the humanitarian community may determine that the only way out of the impasse is to focus on the creation of new national or international norms clearly delineating the role, means, and methods of humanitarian organizations engaging with NSAGs in situations of NIAC. These norms might come in the form of a new treaty on NIAC, or some other international declaration of principled humanitarianism to be codified in national laws. In previous moments of IHL innovation and development, humanitarian restraints on state military and security interests have prevailed in treaty texts. Yet the moral basis upon which leading humanitarian organizations participated in these earlier high moments of IHL law-making and interpretation may today be insufficient to sustain the legal reaffirmation of independent interactions with NSAGs. When internal conflicts are framed as efforts to combat terrorism, such interactions, however benevolent in intent, may be seen as creating unacceptable risks for states' political and security goals.
Developing new policy avenues to facilitate negotiation of access with NSAGs
If the terms of engagement with NSAGs cannot be developed in an open and formal dialogue with states, the terms may need to be elaborated by the organizations themselves as professional standards against which the activities of the organizations can be assessed. Unlike the option of developing norms and focusing on positive law, this policy-oriented approach is likely to involve ad hoc agreements with states and military representatives within a variety of contexts, and may be far more difficult to co-ordinate across the humanitarian profession. Some have argued that the policy-oriented solution to the dilemmas raised in this article might involve (additional) self-regulation on the part of humanitarian organizations, an effort to respond to the counter-terrorism requirements by demonstrating the capacity and willingness of humanitarian organizations to regulate their own engagements with NSAGs with an eye to limiting any benefits that might reach listed groups. Some organizations have reacted negatively to suggestions of 'enhanced' due diligence and self-regulation, or other attempts by the humanitarian community to impose collective limitations on its engagements with NSAGs. Large humanitarian NGOs and UN agencies may be willing to accept increasingly stringent restrictions on their engagements from specific donors or host states (for example, the USAID regulations discussed above, or the requirements placed on NGOs by host states such as Pakistan, Sudan, or Sri Lanka). Such arrangements might be preferable to a wholesale standardization of the regulations concerning humanitarian engagement with NSAGs, including the establishment of professional standards and accountability procedures that would expose sensitive information to external scrutiny.
'Opting out'
Humanitarian organizations might also conclude that neither the development of new norms nor the promulgation of system-wide standards is plausible in light of political or other limitations. For those organizations that base their reputation, their capacity to negotiate with NSAGs, and their relationship with beneficiaries on their commitment to humanitarian principles, the counter-terrorism-related laws and regulations discussed above might be perceived as particularly damaging and as posing too high a risk. These organizations might choose to 'opt out' of emergency humanitarian operations that fall within the web of counter-terrorism laws: namely, those humanitarian engagements that involve the negotiation and delivery of life-saving goods and services to territories under the control of listed NSAGs. Such organizations might remain in countries experiencing internal conflict but refrain from any operations that would put them into contact with such groups. While recognizing that this would result in reduced services to populations under the control of listed groups, these humanitarian organizations may nonetheless choose 'opting out' of engagement with listed NSAGs as a lesser-of-two-evils approach to their work on the ground.
Staying below the radar
Another potential response from the humanitarian community might be to attempt to avoid detection by counter-terrorism agencies. While recognizing the applicability of criminal statutes and restrictive donor regulations to their operations, these organizations might try to obfuscate their engagement with NSAGs (for example, by renting cars from private companies rather than paying taxes to listed NSAGs, or by disguising technical trainings as informal meetings with the community). Other organizations might simply not disclose information about interactions with listed NSAGs to donors and authorities, or even between field offices and headquarters, in violation of applicable laws and donor agreements. Such 'don't ask, don't tell' approaches might be quietly accepted or even encouraged by donor representatives who attempt to maintain plausible deniability regarding the specific relationship between their grantees and listed NSAGs, thereby helping to ensure that substantial humanitarian aid funding is still able to be delivered in targeted areas where NSAGs operate. This approach might extend status quo engagements for the short term but can create significant future liabilities. Unlike 'opting out', the 'staying below the radar' response may maintain the primary humanitarian imperative while undermining other core professional principles in terms of transparency, accountability, and co-ordination. Such an approach may invite increased interference from NSAGs, who may be able to exert additional influence on the conditions of humanitarian assistance when they are aware that organizations are seeking to operate in a less-than-transparent manner.
'Opting in'
A final approach that some within the humanitarian community might consider in light of the risks discussed here constitutes 'opting in' to integrated models of relief and protection activities, under the leadership of political and security actors. While humanitarian organizations might thereby lose significant independence and autonomy in their prospective engagements with listed NSAGs, this approach might allow for more overall space for interacting with NSAGs (albeit in a far more constrained and monitored context), as well as increased scope for delivery of goods and services. In such a model, even states with very restrictive material-support laws might choose to permit otherwise unlawful engagements and activities benefiting listed groups, determining that the oversight and scrutiny of the work of humanitarian organizations can allow for some support to fall into the hands of listed NSAGs. Especially for a government that maintains substantial aid budgets while also promulgating stringent material-support laws, integrating humanitarian organizations into political and security schemes might be an appealing way of maintaining both support for vulnerable populations and the government's international reputation as a donor state. Under this model, states would probably permit a small group of 'vetted' humanitarian organizations to carry out assistance operations, including engagement with listed NSAGs, perhaps relying on the most elite and long-standing organizations to carry out the bulk of approved projects. For humanitarian organizations, this approach would have the benefit of minimizing legal liabilities and unpredictability, as well as allowing the maintenance of some engagements with listed NSAGs, but at the cost of being subject to political and security decisions beyond their control regarding the scope and operational independence of their work in specific conflict situations. In addition, NSAGs and beneficiaries might increasingly call into question the independence and neutrality of humanitarian organizations that 'opt in' to donor states' security schemes in these ways.
Questions about this approach may be seen in the current heated debate within the humanitarian establishment regarding how to understand the potential carve-out of exemptions and licensing schemes. 78 Some within the humanitarian community see it as the best and safest short-term strategy to minimize liability and risk, and to indicate to donors that they take seriously the threat of misappropriation of funds to terrorist entities. Others worry that the introduction of these schemes into humanitarian negotiations will create a twotiered system -operations for which exemptions are granted and operations for which exemptions are not granted (regardless of the underlying IHL and international normative frameworks but with significant potential consequences in terms of domestic legal liability).
Conclusion
In many ways, the web of laws and policies discussed in this article seems paralysing for humanitarian actors: an impossible regulatory framework in which success or compliance in one arena is likely to raise risks and liabilities in another. Nonetheless, billions of dollars of humanitarian funding continue to flow to humanitarian organizations, nearly all of which have operations in countries where listed NSAGs control or operate from part of the territory. States continue to uphold principles of humanitarian access and assistance in the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, and other forums. And donors continue to encourage humanitarian organizations to act in a transparent, accountable manner. As such, it is unlikely that humanitarianism, as a professional field and as a set of legal and normative 78 These are frameworks that allow humanitarian organizations to apply for discrete, context-specific exemptions to criminal or regulatory laws in order to carry out operations in areas where listed groups control territory, or where there is a high likelihood of having to engage with listed NSAGs.
principles, will disappear under the weight of the counter-terrorism agenda. Yet the contradictions described here will almost certainly have a significant impact over time on the development of humanitarian practices and policies. The balancing of these contradictory norms will require expanded negotiation skills and a thorough legal understanding on the part of humanitarian professionals, both at the stage of planning operations at headquarters and at the stage of implementing programmes in the field.
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